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Democracy is widely believed to contribute to economic growth and public health. However, we find that this
conventional wisdom is no longer true and even reversed; democracy has persistent negative impacts on GDP
growth since the beginning of this century. This finding emerges from five different instrumental variable strate-
gies. Our analysis suggests that democracies cause slower growth through less investment, less trade, and slower
value-added growth in manufacturing and services. For 2020, democracy is also found to cause more deaths
from Covid-19.
Keywords: Democracy, Economic Growth, Public Health, Causality
*Narita: Department of Economics and Cowles Foundation, Yale University, email: yusuke.narita@yale.edu
†Sudo: Yale University, email: ayumi.sudo@yale.edu
I Introduction
Does democracy promote economic prosperity and the safety of life? Many believe so, but this question is becom-
ing increasingly debatable. In the past two decades, the spectacular economic growth in China, the collapse of the
Arab Spring, and the rise of populist politics in Europe and South and North America, have provoked skepticism
about democracy’s continued strength as a political system. This sentiment is well expressed by recent bestseller
titles such as How Democracies Die and How Democracy Ends. Furthermore, in 2020 and 2021, the US and
other major democracies face historic recessions and death tolls due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The democratic
countries stand in stark contrast to China and other autocratic countries that quickly contained the pandemic.
This paper studies how democracy impacts economic growth and public health during 2001-2020. We con-
struct a dataset with historical and present-day information on the demographic, economic, health, geographic,
and political characteristics of most of the world’s countries. We analyze the data with five different instrumental
variables (IV) strategies. Our bottom line is that stronger democracies cause lower economic growth throughout
the past 20 years. Moreover, democracy causes not only worse GDP declines but also higher Covid-19 mortality
during 2020.
We start by looking at the cross-country correlation between national outcomes and a widely-used electoral
democracy index. The index quantifies the extent to which the ideal of electoral democracy is achieved, by
aggregating freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, and suffrage. As reported in Figure
1a, democracy is associated with lower growth rates in 2001-2019. This negative correlation is in contrast to
the 1990s and 1980s, for which periods we and the prior literature find no such negative association between
democracy and economic growth (Figure A1). Furthermore, in 2020, democracy is not only associated with
bigger shocks to GDP but also more Covid-19 deaths (Figures 1b and 1c).
Our goal is to investigate whether this recent association of democracy with worse outcomes has any causal
meaning. To identify democracy’s causal effect, we adopt five of the most influential IVs for current political
institutions:
• Mortality of European colonial settlers (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001)
• Population density in the 1500s (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002)
• Availability of crops and minerals, which reflect historical agricultural endowments and influence political
organization (Easterly and Levine, 2003)
• Fraction of the population speaking English and a Western European language (Hall and Jones, 1999)
• Legal origin (LaPorta, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), based on the idea that which origin country in Europe
colonized a country influenced its political regime.
These IVs help identify the effects of political institutions by tracing back their origins to geographical and histor-
ical determinants. Such determinants of today’s democracy level capture the feasibility and incentives of colonial
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powers to invest in local institution-building, as well as each country’s cultural and industrial affinities with West-
ern culture. Indeed, first-stage regressions show that many of these IVs are important drivers of the cross-country
variation in today’s democracy levels.
All of these IVs turn out to produce similar two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the impact of democ-
racy. They all show that democracy persistently causes worse outcomes in this century. The median estimate
among our five IV strategies is that a standard deviation increase in the democracy level causes a 2 percentage-
point GDP decrease per year in 2001-2019 (50% of the outcome mean) and a 1.8 percentage-point GDP decrease
in 2020 (40% of the outcome mean). Democracy also causes more Covid-19 deaths in 2020, with a median es-
timate of a 350 increase in Covid-19 deaths per million (120% of the outcome mean) per a standard deviation
increase in democracy. To facilitate interpretation of the findings, the political-regime difference between China
and the US is equivalent to a three standard deviation difference in the democracy index.
Our finding is robust to various alternative specification and measurement choices. Controlling for latitude,
temperature, precipitation, population density, median age, diabetes prevalence, and continent dummies does not
change the results. Controls for baseline total or per-capita GDP also have little effect on the estimates. The results
change little with alternative indices for democracy or alternative weighting of countries. Moreover, the adverse
effect of democracy is robust to excluding outlier nations from the sample. The result is not driven by the US and
China alone, nor is it driven by G7 nations. The weakness of democracy is, therefore, a global phenomenon in the
21st century.
We explore many potential mechanisms that underlie democracy’s perverse effect in this century. What turned
out to be important are investments, trade, and value-added growth in manufacturing and services. 2SLS estimates
using IVs for political regimes suggest that democracy decreases investments as a share of GDP, depresses imports
and exports, and slows value-added growth in manufacturing and services. These results suggest that since the turn
of the 21st century, democracy might have stopped improving these key building blocks for growth. In contrast,
other channels such as school enrollment, child mortality, and taxes as a share of GDP appear to be less important
for explaining democracy’s adverse effect.1
Related Literature. Any cause of macroeconomic growth and national public health is difficult to identify
due to omitted variable biases, measurement errors, and limited data size (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997;
Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005; Helpman, 2009; Galor, 2011). Classic cross-country regression studies claim
that democracy’s cumulative effect on economic growth may be negligible (Barro, 1997; Przeworski and Limongi,
1993; Przeworski et al., 2000). With more quasi-experimental research designs, however, later studies show that
democracies experience more stable, long-term growth than non-democracies (Acemoglu et al., 2018; Aghion,
Alesina and Trebbi, 2007; Madsen, Raschky and Skali, 2015; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Persson and
Tabellini, 2006, 2007; Quinn and Woolley, 2001; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005). Similar findings exist for democ-
racy’s positive effects on health (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro, 2012; Kudamatsu,
1We also provide evidence that a major channel for democracy’s adverse effect in 2020 appears to be weaker and narrower containment
policies at the beginning of the pandemic, rather than the speed of policy implementation.
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2012). More broadly defined Western social institutions are also shown to positively affect economic growth (Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Hall and Jones, 1999).2 The prior work
chiefly studies the 20th and earlier centuries, while we analyze the 21st century with quasi-experimental research
designs.
Our results suggest that the role of democracy in economic growth may be different between this and previous
centuries. This finding echoes a growing set of recent facts that challenge the conventional wisdom about economic
growth. For example, as opposed to studies from the 1990s, Kremer, Willis and You (2021) and references therein
note a trend towards convergence (poor countries catch up with rich) since 2000. For developing countries,
Easterly (2019) reports that policy outcomes in inflation, black market premiums, currency overvaluation, real
interest rates, and trade shares to GDP started improving since the late 1990s. Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2011) document a series of facts about China’s unprecedented economic transition and present a new growth
model to explain the facts. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2016) and references therein point out that American labor-
market adjustments to China’s trade shocks challenge much of the received empirical wisdom.
Our analysis on 2020 also contributes to the literature on the economics of pandemics. Researchers attempt
to explain the cross-country heterogeneity in Covid-19-related outcomes. Studies show that obedience to travel
restrictions or compliance with social distancing differ by culture, social capital, government communication, and
political systems (Allcott et al., 2020; Alsan et al., 2020; Frey, Chen and Presidente, 2020; Grossman et al., 2020;
Schmelz, 2021). None of them find a root cause of Covid-19-related outcomes.
We integrate these strands of the literature to find that democracy causes worse economic and public health
outcomes since the beginning of the 21st century. To our knowledge, this paper seems to be the only study that
shows any substantially adverse effect of democracy on any important national outcome.
We organize this paper as follows. Section II describes our data and provides descriptive statistics. Section III
analyzes the correlation between democracy and national outcomes. Section IV presents our 2SLS estimates of the
causal effect of democracy. After Section V discusses alternative specifications, placebo tests using 1980-2000,
and the channels behind democracy’s effect, Section VI concludes.
II Data
We use the following five types of data to investigate how the performance of different countries in the 21st century
depends on their political regimes. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our main variables.3
Economic and public health outcomes. The primary outcome we look at is the mean annual GDP growth
rate between 2001 and 2019 from the World Economic Outlook by the International Monetary Fund. As Figure 1a
2Other studies inspect the micro mechanisms behind democracy’s effects. Some studies use regional differences in democratic represen-
tation to find that higher representation leads to greater investments in education and public health (Baum and Lake, 2003; Doucouliagos and
Ulubaşoğlu, 2008; Lake and Baum, 2001; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). Studies such as Besley and Case (2003) and Burgess et al. (2015)
focus on how different political processes within countries lead to different income redistributions and provisions of public goods.
3Descriptive statistics for the remaining variables are in Appendix Table A1. Appendix Table A2 provides details on data sources.
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shows, most countries experienced positive economic growth. For our sample of 164 countries, the mean is 3.9%
with a standard deviation of 2.1% (Table 1 row 1).
We also look at two outcomes specific to 2020: the GDP growth rate between 2019 and 2020 and the total
number of Covid-19 deaths per million. We source data for the GDP growth rate from the IMF and data for
Covid-19 deaths from the Covid-19 Data Repository Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns
Hopkins University. 2020 was a disastrous year, with the average growth rate at -4.8%, the worst since World War
II, and the average number of Covid-19 deaths per million at 297 (Table 1 rows 2 and 3). Both outcomes differed
drastically across countries, with a standard deviation of 7.9% for GDP growth rates and 381 for Covid-19 deaths
per million. Figures 1b and 1c visualize these patterns.
Democracy indices. Measuring the extent of democracy is tricky. Our baseline measure is the electoral
democracy index from the Varieties of Democracy Project. It considers multiple facets of democracy, such as the
freedom of association, clean elections, and freedom of expression. It is increasingly accepted in the economics
and political science literature as a measure for democracy (Alesina, Tabellini and Trebbi, 2017). As shown in Ta-
ble 1, the index captures our intuitive notion of democratic countries. According to the index, the most democratic
countries are Sweden and Denmark, while the least democratic country is Saudi Arabia. For robustness, we also
use the polity index by the Center for Systemic Peace, the freedom index by Freedom House, and the democracy
index by the Economist Intelligence Unit.4
Country characteristics. To control for country characteristics and weight countries, we collect country-
level data for GDP, absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, median age, and
diabetes prevalence. We source data from the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Diabetes
Federation.
IVs. To identify the causal effect of democracy, we use five of the most widely-used IVs for political institu-
tions, as listed in the introduction and further discussed below. For each IV, we obtain and extend data from the
original authors.
Mechanisms. To assess the mechanisms behind democracy’s effect in the 21st century, we obtain data for
investment, trade, and value added in manufacturing and services from the World Bank Development Indicators.
On average, a country invested 24% as a share of GDP in 2001-2019, with Bhutan having the highest rate of 59%.
Although the mean import and export value index between 2001-2019 more than tripled relative to 2000, the
extent of the increase was diverse, where countries such as Liberia experienced a decrease in exports. Moreover,
many countries experienced strong value-added growth in manufacturing and services, except for countries such
as Venezuela and Greece.
4The polity index measures democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions by evaluating executive recruitment, constraints
on executive authority, and political competition. Meanwhile, the freedom index focuses more on the political rights and civil liberties that
citizens enjoy. The democracy index by the Economist Intelligence Unit rates democracy holistically by considering electoral processes,
government functions, political participation, democratic culture, and civil liberties. Appendix Table A10 shows the correlation between the
indices.
4
III Democracy is Associated with Worse Outcomes
Before exploring democracy’s causal effect, we first look at democratic and authoritarian countries’ performance
in the 21st century. Figure 1a shows that higher levels of democracy are associated with lower GDP growth rates
in 2001-19. For 2020, Figures 1b and 1c show that more democratic nations experience bigger GDP loss and more
deaths from Covid-19.
To quantify their magnitude, statistical significance, and sensitivity to controls, we run the following OLS
regressions of each outcome against the democracy index at the baseline year5:
Yi = µ +αDemocracyi +X
′
i γ + εi (1)
where Yi is the outcome for country i, µ is the intercept, Democracyi is the democracy index (normalized to have
mean zero and standard deviation one), X
′
i is a vector of other country-level covariates, and εi is a residual. The
coefficient of interest is α , which quantifies the association between democracy and the outcome. We weight
countries by GDP in the baseline specification. Results are similar with weighting by population and with no
weighting.
The OLS estimates in Table 2’s Panel B show that democracy is strongly associated with worse performance
in the 21st century. In column 9, for example, a standard deviation increase in the democracy measure corresponds
to a 1.7 (s.e. = 0.4) percentage-point GDP decrease per year in 2001-2019. Democracy’s negative association is
accentuated in 2020, where a standard deviation increase is associated with both a 1.9 (s.e. = 0.5) percentage-point
decrease in GDP and a 249.4 (s.e. = 52.3) increase in Covid-19-related deaths per million.
The results are not sensitive to the addition of controls. It is plausible that climate, population density, pop-
ulation aging, and diabetes affect these outcomes. To control for these factors, we add absolute latitude, mean
temperature, mean precipitation, population density, median age, and diabetes prevalence as covariates. The re-
sulting estimates in Panel B’s column 10 remain similar. The estimates are -1.2 (s.e. = 0.6) for mean GDP growth
rates in 2001-2019, -1.6 (s.e. = 0.3) for GDP growth rates in 2020, and 309.6 (s.e. = 47.0) for Covid-19-related
deaths per million. We also show in Appendix Table A3 that controlling for baseline total GDP and GDP per
capita preserves the significant negative relationship between democracy and economic growth.
IV Causal Effects of Democracy in the 21st Century
A IVs for Political Regimes
We cannot interpret the above relationship as causal, however. There are many omitted determinants of outcomes
that also correlate with democracies. To identify democracy’s causal effect, we adopt five IV strategies. Our
choice of instruments considers several centuries of world history as follows.
52000 is the baseline year for outcomes in 2001-2019. 2019 is the baseline year for outcomes in 2020.
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European settler mortality IV. European settler mortality is the mortality rate (annualized deaths per thou-
sand mean strength) of European soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies between the seventeenth
and nineteenth centuries. Europeans used mortality rates to decide where to settle (Curtin, 1989). In colonies
with inhospitable germs, they did not settle and established extractive institutions that extracted local resources
and lacked checks and balances against government expropriation. In colonies with hospitable disease environ-
ments, Europeans settled and established inclusive institutions that protected individual liberties. The effect of
these institutions persists today.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) use this IV to show that inclusive institutions, which encompass the
social, economic, legal, and political organization of society, promote economic growth. Consistent with their
hypothesis, Figure 2a shows that countries with higher European settler mortality have lower democracy levels
today. This fact motivates us to use European settler mortality as an IV among ex-European colonies.
Past population density IV. Population density in the 1500s is the number of inhabitants per square kilome-
ter in the 16th century. Population density at the beginning of the colonial age determined colonial institutions’
inclusiveness. Sparse populations in the 16th century induced Europeans to settle and develop Western-style insti-
tutions, while denser populations made extractive institutions more profitable. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2002) use this IV to show that institutions positively affect economic growth.6 Figure 2b confirms that higher
population density in the 16th century corresponds to lower democratic levels today. Similar to the European
settler mortality IV, we use this IV for ex-European colonies.
Legal origin IV. This IV is a dummy variable for British legal origin that takes the value 1 if the country’s
legal origin is British (common law) and 0 if it is French, German, or Scandinavian (civil law). Many countries
derive their legal systems from European colonization. Such legal origin determines how the law protects civil
liberties and political rights. With this IV, LaPorta, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) show that stronger legal protections
for investors promote financial development.
Fraction speaking English or European. The fraction speaking English or European is the fraction of the
population speaking English or a major Western European language (French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish)
as a mother tongue in 1992. As Hall and Jones (1999) argue, an essential feature of world history is the spread
of Western European influence, which created an institutional and cultural background conducive to democracy.
The language variables are proxies for such influence. Indeed, the fraction of the population speaking a major
European language positively correlates with democracy (Figure 2c). Hall and Jones (1999) use these IVs to show
that social infrastructure positively affects productivity.7 Like the original authors, we include all countries in the
world in the sample definition.8
The availability of crops and minerals as IVs. Bananas, coffee, maize, millet, rice, rubber, sugarcane,
and wheat are dummy variables coded 1 if a country produced the crop in 1990. Copper and silver are coded
6They also use urbanization in the 1500s as an IV. Using this IV produces similar estimates.
7The original specification also uses absolute latitude and the Frankel-Romer trade share as IVs. Our results stay similar with or without
these variables as IVs.
8Missing data restricts the actual sample to 136 countries.
6
1 if a country mined the mineral in 1990. According to Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), certain commodities
induced economies of scale and incentivized slave labor, which led to extractive institutions. Meanwhile, other
commodities encouraged production by middle-class farmers, which induced inclusive institutions. Thus, the
dummy variables reflect the historical agricultural endowments that influenced political regimes. Based on these
IVs, Easterly and Levine (2003) show that geographic endowments affect development only through social and
political institutions and that better institutions encourage economic growth. We include all countries in the world
in the base sample.9
We are aware that none of these IVs are ideal. Each IV is likely to be threatened by its own mix of measure-
ment errors, omitted variables, and exclusion violations. Our strategy is to use these five different IVs with the
expectation that they work as robustness checks with each other. Importantly, we find no apparent reason to believe
that potential exclusion violations by different IVs lead to biases of the same sign. For example, the European
settler mortality IV may have excluded negative effects on growth since worse disease environments may directly
hamper economic activities. On the other hand, the population density IV may have excluded positive effects on
growth thanks to returns to scale and agglomeration effects. These two exclusion violations would result in biases
of opposite signs.10 This observation provides support for the idea of using the different IVs as mutual robustness
checks.
B IV Estimation
This section presents our main results. With the above IVs, we estimate democracy’s impact by the following
2SLS regressions:
Yi = µ +αDemocracyi +X
′
i γ + εi (1)




i δ +υi (2)
The second-stage equation (1) is the same as Section III’s OLS regression. The coefficient α represents the
effect of Democracyi on Yi, the outcome variable, conditional on a vector of country characteristics X
′
i . Given




Does democracy cause worse economic and public health performance? Reduced-form figures using European
settler mortality suggest so. Figures 2d, 2e, and 2f show that higher European settler mortality causes lower
democracy levels, which cause slower economic growth in 2001-2019, bigger shocks to GDP in 2020, and more
deaths from Covid-19.
Table 2 reports the 2SLS estimates of the effect of democracy, using each of the five IV strategies. They all
9Since Easterly and Levine’s dataset only contains 71 countries, we extend their data to cover 142 countries, as explained in Appendix
A.1.
10Appendix Table A4 summarizes the likely direction of bias for each IV.
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indicate significant adverse effects of democracy. Columns 1 and 2 show our estimates using log European settler
mortality as an IV for our base sample of ex-colonies. The first-stage regression in Appendix Table A5 column
1 shows that a 1% increase in European settler mortality is associated with a 0.01 standard deviation decrease in
democracy levels today. The corresponding 2SLS regression estimates in Panel A’s column 1 show that a standard
deviation increase in the democracy measure causes a 2.2 (s.e. = 0.3) percentage-point decrease per year in GDP
in 2001-2019. Democracy’s effect persists in 2020. We estimate that a standard deviation increase causes a 1.7
(s.e. = 0.5) percentage-point decrease in GDP in 2020 and a 350.0 (s.e. = 75.4) increase in Covid-19-related
deaths per million.
Our confidence in the plausibility of the IV estimates is bolstered by the fact that controlling for various
potential sources of omitted variable bias has little impact on our estimates. In column 2, we control for climate,
population density, population aging, and diabetes prevalence. The coefficients remain similar. The estimates are
-3.3 (s.e. = 0.7) percentage points for mean GDP growth rates in 2001-2019, -1.8 (s.e. = 0.3) percentage points
for GDP growth rates in 2020, and 332.3 (s.e. = 37.3) for Covid-19-related deaths per million in 2020.
To check whether the above results are sensitive to the choice of IVs, columns 3 and 4 use population density
in the 1500s as an IV for a similar sample of ex-colonies. We continue to find a negative effect of democracy. A
1% increase in population density at the beginning of the colonial age is associated with a 0.005 standard deviation
decrease in democracy (Appendix Table A5 column 3). The 2SLS estimates in Table 2 column 3 are -2.3 (s.e.
= 0.4) percentage points for GDP growth rates per year in 2001-2019, -1.5 (s.e. = 0.7) percentage points for the
GDP growth rate in 2020, and 349.1 (s.e. = 70.6) for Covid-19-related deaths per million in 2020. The results stay
similar even with controls.
The overall pattern remains the same for the legal origin IV in columns 5 and 6. The first-stage regression
shows that British legal origin (common law) leads to a 2.0 (s.e. = 0.6) standard deviation increase in democratic
levels (Appendix Table A5). The corresponding 2SLS estimates in Table 2 column 5 are -1.8 (s.e. = 0.5) for GDP
growth rates per year in 2001-2019, -1.7 (s.e. = 0.7) for GDP growth rates in 2020, and 298.1 (s.e. = 80.2) for
Covid-19-related deaths per million. Adding controls in column 6 preserves the estimates.
Columns 7 and 8 use the fraction of the population speaking English or a European language as IVs. Unlike
the previous three IVs, the base sample definition is not limited to former European colonies. Yet, the results
remain similar to those in the previous columns. The estimates in column 7 are -1.2 (s.e. = 0.9) for GDP growth
rates per year in 2001-2019, -1.8 (s.e. = 0.7) for the GDP growth rate in 2020, and 437.5 (s.e. = 0.7) for Covid-19
related deaths per million in 2020. Controlling for baseline covariates in column 8 barely changes the estimates.
Finally, we use dummies for the ability to grow certain crops and mine minerals as IVs. The estimates among
the 142 countries for which data is available are consistent with our baseline results. The coefficients are -2.4 (s.e.
= 0.5) for GDP growth rates per year in 2001-2019, -2.2 (s.e. = 0.6) for the GDP growth rate in 2020, and 278.5
(s.e. = 68.2) for Covid-19 deaths per million. The regression with controls in column 10 produces similar results.
To further quantify the importance of the democracy treatment, Appendix Table A6 multiplies the estimated
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coefficient with each country’s democracy index and subtracts the resulting democracy effect from the country’s
outcome. Once we account for democracy’s effect, countries in Europe, North America, and South America no
longer have worse outcomes. This exercise suggests that their relatively poor performance in the 21st-century is
largely explained by their more democratic political regimes.
In summary, the several different sources of variation in democracy from the historical democratization process
lead to estimates of the impact of democracy on GDP that are of the same sign as the OLS estimates. It is
particularly reassuring that the different IV strategies, which use different sources of variation in democracy,




Our analysis may be sensitive to measurement and modeling choices, such as whether to control for baseline GDP
and other important characteristics, how to measure democracy, how to weight countries, and how to measure
economic performance in 2020. Extreme nations may also be driving our results. Below we check whether these
concerns threaten our findings.
Control for baseline GDP. We test whether our results are due to the mechanical reason that more developed
countries tend to grow slower. Appendix Table A7 runs regressions with baseline total GDP or GDP per capita
as controls. For economic growth in 2020, as an alternative way to control for baseline GDP, Appendix Table
A8 uses as the outcome the difference in GDP growth rates between 2019 and 2020. The resulting estimates all
continue to find democracy’s negative effect, confirming that baseline GDP conditions do not drive our results.
Control for continents. We additionally control for dummy variables for each continent in Appendix Table
A9. Although the estimates are less precisely estimated, we continue to observe democracy’s negative effect
on economic growth and public health. This suggests that the democracy treatment is significant regardless of
continent.
Alternative democracy indices. We adopt alternative democracy indices by the Center for Systemic Peace,
Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Appendix Table A10 shows that these indices are highly
correlated with each other. Importantly, Appendix Table A11 confirms that our results stay similar regardless of
which democracy index to use.
Alternative weightings. Our 2SLS results so far weight countries by GDP. We believe that GDP weighting
is reasonable, especially when the outcomes are GDP growth rates. Nonetheless, we compare our results with
weighting by population or no weighting in Appendix Table A12. The qualitative pattern is the same among the
three ways to weight countries.
Alternative sample definitions. To check if the US and China drive our results, we show our results without
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the two countries in Appendix Table A13. We also re-estimate our preferred specification without outlier countries
with a standardized residual above 1.96 or below -1.96 in Appendix Table A14. Furthermore, we remove G7
countries from the sample in Appendix Table A15. In all cases, we continue to estimate democracy’s adverse
effect. Thus, the negative impact of democracy is a global phenomenon and not driven by a small number of
countries.
B Placebo Tests using 1980-2000
It is natural to ask whether our finding is specific to the 21st century. Additional evidence suggests so. We apply
exactly the same analysis to data from the 20th century. The resulting estimates show that the negative association
between democracy and economic growth did not exist in 1981-1990 or 1991-2000 (Appendix Figure A1). More
importantly, for the same period, we do not observe a negative causal effect (Appendix Table A16). We therefore
conclude that the way democracy matters for economic growth might have changed around the turn of the 21st
century.
C Mechanisms Behind Democracy’s Adverse Effect
In this final section, we explore the potential mechanisms through which democracy might affect growth in 2001-
2019, though we cannot distinguish between these mechanisms or rule out other possible channels at work. We
estimate the following 2SLS equations:
Mi = η +ρDemocracyi +X ′i φ +ωi (3)
First Stage: Democracyi = ζ +Z′iβ +X
′
i δ +υi. (4)
where Mi is one of several potential channels, including investment, international trade, and value-added growth.
We take the mean of each variable during 2001-2019.
Table 3 summarizes our results. We find that, in this century, democracy decreases investments as a share of
GDP, decreases trade, and slows value-added growth in manufacturing and services. Investment is measured by
the total value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less of disposals
of valuables for a unit or sector. Panel A column 1 shows that a standard deviation increase in democracy is
associated with a 4.8 (s.e. = 1.4) percentage-point decrease in investment as a share of GDP per year in 2001-2019
(20% of the mean). Panels B-F show that democracy causes the decrease in investment, with the median estimate
in column 1 at -6.3 (s.e. = 1.5) percentage points (25% of the mean). Adding baseline controls preserves our
negative estimates.
Democracy also decreases international trade. We look at the import and export value indices, which are the
current value of imports or exports converted to US dollars and expressed as a percentage of that in 2000. Columns
3-4 in Panel A shows that more democratic nations experienced slower growth in imports. Panels B-F show that
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democracy causes the slower growth in imports.11 Column 3’s median estimate among the five IV strategies is
a 146 (s.e. = 30.3) percentage-point decrease in import value relative to 2000 per year in 2001-2019 (45% of
the mean). The coefficients in column 4 remain large and significant. Columns 5-6 exhibit similar estimates for
exports. All estimates in column 5 estimate that democracy causes slower growth in exports, with a 143.8 (s.e.
= 27.8) percentage-point decrease as the median estimate (40% of the mean). We observe similar estimates in
column 6. A potential explanation for the dampening effect of democracy on trade is that electoral competition
could lead to trade barriers (Anderson, Rausser and Swinnen, 2013).
Columns 7-10 show that democracy also dampens value-added growth in manufacturing and services during
2001-2019. Here, the manufacturing sector consists of industries that physically or chemically transform materials
into new products. The service sector includes services such as wholesale and retail trade, transport, education,
healthcare, and finance. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all output and subtracting in-
termediate inputs. Panel A’s columns 7-10 show that democracy is associated with lower value-added growth in
manufacturing and services. Panels B-F show that this relationship is causal12. The median estimate in column 7
is that a standard deviation increase in democracy causes a 2.3 (s.e. = 0.6) percentage-point decrease in manufac-
turing value added per year in 2001-2019 (60% of the mean). Similarly, democracy also depresses value-added
growth in services. Column 9’s median estimate among Panels B-F is -2.7 (s.e. = 0.3) percentage-points (60% of
the mean). The addition of baseline controls does not change the direction of our estimates. Appendix Table A17
shows that the results are robust to controls for baseline GDP.
The above analysis suggests that, in the 21st century, non-democracies better foster investment, trade, and
value-added growth in manufacturing and services than democracies. In Appendix Table A18, we also consider
taxation, school enrollment, and child mortality, but we do not find a strong causal effect of democracy. Ultimately,
our results suggest that democracy might have stopped improving building blocks for growth. Appendix A.2
provides separate analysis for policy channels in 2020.
VI Conclusion
We bring data to revisit skepticism about the performance of democratic political regimes, which is as old as the
invention of democracy:
“having them [the multitude of the citizens] take part in the greatest offices is not safe: through
injustice and imprudence they would act unjustly in some respects and err in others.” (Aristotle,
Politics, 1281b25)
The collection of evidence from five different IV methods, all leading to similar estimates of the impact of
democracy, suggests that democracy dampens economic growth in this century. Likely channels behind democ-
11Adding a control for the percentage-share of imports in GDP at the baseline does not change the negative estimates.
12Adding a control for value added as a share of GDP at the baseline does not change the negative estimates.
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racy’s negative effect are less investment, less trade, and slower productivity growth. The negative effect of democ-
racy is especially strong in 2020, in which year democracy also causes more Covid-19-related deaths. Overall,
political institutions still matter for economic growth, but how they matter might have changed between the prior
and current centuries.
Our analysis leads to a variety of avenues for future work. We plan to measure democracy’s effects on other
outcome measures, such as economic inequality and citizen’s happiness. We also need to see if the negative impact
of democracy will result in geopolitical movements away from democracy. We leave these important directions to
future work.13
The policy implication of our result is not straightforward. Needless to say, our analysis does not imply a
general case against democracy, for at least two reasons. First, democracy per se has normative and procedural
virtues, regardless of whether they result in good economic and health outcomes. Second, despite our findings on
democracy’s impacts on economic growth in the 21st century and public health during the pandemic, democracies
may produce better outcomes in the long run or in other aspects. Our preferred interpretation of our findings
is that there may be room for improvement in particular aspects of democracy in particular situations, so that
governments can decisively and thoroughly take potentially unpopular, yet effective actions to support economic
growth and protect citizen’s lives.
13It is also important to update the 2020 analysis with more accurate data for Covid-19 deaths. One potential solution is to look at excess
deaths data like the World Mortality Dataset, but its coverage is limited. 2SLS regressions for excess deaths per million in Appendix Table
A19 does not exhibit a conclusive relationship.
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Figure 1: Correlation Between Democracy and Outcomes
(a) Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
(b) GDP Growth Rate in 2020
(c) Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million in 2020
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between democracy and three outcomes: the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-2019 (Panel (a)), the GDP growth rate in 2020 (Panel (b)),
and Covid-19 deaths per million in 2020 (Panel (c)). The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The size of each circle (country)
is proportional to its baseline GDP. The colors depend on the level of the democracy index (warmer colors for democracy and darker colors for autocracies). The line is the OLS
regression fitted line without controls and weights countries by baseline GDP. The shaded area corresponds to the 95% confidence interval.Variable definitions and data sources are in
Appendix Table A2.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Outcomes Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019 164 3.9 2.1 −2.7 3.7 10.4
(Venezuela) (Latvia) (Iraq)
GDP Growth Rate in 2020 164 −4.8 7.9 −59.7 −4.0 43.4
(Libya) (Angola) (Guyana)
Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million in 2020 164 297.1 381.7 0.0 86.9 1,685.0
(Bhutan) (Maldives) (Belgium)
Treatments Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) 164 0.0 1.0 −1.8 0.01 1.5
(Saudi Arabia) (Madagascar) (Sweden)
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 164 0.0 1.0 −2.1 −0.02 1.5
(Saudi Arabia) (Ivory Coast) (Denmark)
Controls GDP (Current USD, Billions, 2000) 164 203.5 920.0 0.1 11.7 10,252.4
(Sao Tome and Principe) (El Salvador) (United States)
GDP (Current USD, Billions, 2019) 164 524.8 2,094.7 0.4 53.4 21,433.2
(Sao Tome and Principe) (Slovenia) (United States)
Absolute Latitude 164 26.2 17.4 0 23 65
(Dem. Rep. of the Congo) (Mexico) (Iceland)
Mean Temperature (◦c, 1991-2000) 164 18.6 8.4 −6.2 22.2 28.6
(Canada) (Angola) (Mali)
Mean Temperature (◦c, 1991-2016) 164 18.8 8.3 −6.0 22.4 28.9
(Canada) (Iraq) (Mali)
Mean Precipitation (mm per Month, 1991-2000) 164 91.4 63.8 2.7 78.2 252.7
(Egypt) (Angola) (Malaysia)
Mean Precipitation (mm per Month, 1991-2016) 164 92.6 64.7 2.5 78.9 259.1
(Egypt) (Luxembourg) (Malaysia)
Population Density (Number of People per km2, 2000) 164 152.6 475.6 1.5 59.8 5,755.5
(Mongolia) (Benin) (Singapore)
Population Density (Number of People per km2, 2019) 164 209.5 692.8 2.1 81.1 8,291.9
(Mongolia) (Greece) (Singapore)
Median Age (2000) 164 25.6 8.0 15 22.7 41
(Burundi) (Guyana) (Japan)
Median Age (2019) 164 30.3 9.2 15.2 29.6 48.4
(Niger) (Lebanon) (Japan)
Diabetes Prevalence (%, 2019) 164 7.5 4.0 1 6.4 22
(Benin) (Cambodia) (Sudan)
IVs Log European Settler Mortality (Annual No. of Deaths per Thousand) 77 4.7 1.2 2.1 4.4 8.0
(Australia) (Barbados) (Mali)
Log Population Density in 1500s (No. of Inhabitants per km2) 89 0.6 1.6 −3.8 0.4 4.6
(Canada) (Costa Rica) (Egypt)
British Legal Origin 93 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Algeria) (Algeria) (Australia)
Fraction Speaking English 136 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Algeria) (Algeria) (Barbados)
Fraction Speaking European 136 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Angola) (Angola) (France)
Bananas 142 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0
(Albania) (Angola) (Angola)
Coffee 142 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Albania) (Albania) (Angola)
Copper 151 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Algeria) (Algeria) (Albania)
Maize 142 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0
(Bahrain) (Albania) (Albania)
Millet 142 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Albania) (Albania) (Angola)
Rice 142 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0
(Austria) (Albania) (Albania)
Silver 142 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Albania) (Albania) (Bangladesh)
Sugarcane 148 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
(Albania) (Albania) (Algeria)
Rubber 142 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0
(Albania) (Angola) (Angola)
Wheat 142 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0
(Bahrain) (Albania) (Albania)
Potential
Mechanisms Mean Investment Share of GDP in 2001-2019 (%) 154 24.2 7.0 9.8 23.5 58.6
(Guinea-Bissau) (Benin) (Bhutan)
Mean Import Value Index in 2001-2019 (2000=100) 163 330.6 145.6 122.5 301.9 781.1
(Liberia) (Guinea) (Georgia)
Mean Export Value Index in 2001-2019 (2000=100) 163 364.4 371.7 86.6 270.4 3,872.5
(Liberia) (Iran) (Sierra Leone)
Mean Manufacturing Value Added in 2001-2019 (Annual % Growth) 162 3.7 3.7 −5.6 3.4 28.8
(Venezuela) (Slovenia) (Gabon)
Mean Services Value Added in 2001-2019 (Annual % Growth) 160 4.5 2.1 0.5 4.2 11.9
(Greece) (Latvia) (Liberia)
Notes: Parentheses contain country names corresponding to the minimum, median and maximum values of each variable. When we observe multiple countries corresponding to the same
minimum, median or maximum, we choose the first country in alphabetical order. When we do not find a country that corresponds exactly to the median, we choose the country with the
closest value.Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Figure 2: Causal Effects of Democracy
(a) First-stage: Log European Settler Mortality IV
(b) First-stage: Log Population Density in 1500s IV
(c) First-stage: Fraction Speaking European IV
(d) Reduced form: Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
(e) Reduced form: GDP Growth Rate in 2020
(f) Reduced form: Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million
Notes: Panels (a), (b), and (c) show the first-stage relationship between democracy in 2019 and three univariate IVs: the log European settler mortality IV, the log population density
in 1500s IV, and the fraction speaking European IV. Panels (d), (e), and (f) show the reduced-form relationship between the log European settler mortality IV and three outcomes:
mean GDP growth rates in 2001-2019, GDP growth rates in 2020, and Covid-19-related deaths per million. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and
standard deviation one. The size of each circle (country) is proportional to its baseline GDP. The colors depend on the level of the democracy index (warmer colors for democracy
and darker colors for autocracies). The line is the OLS regression fitted line without controls and weights countries by baseline GDP. The shaded area corresponds to the 95%
confidence interval. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table 2: 2SLS Regression Estimates of Democracy’s Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.2 -3.3 -2.3 -3.4 -1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -2.4 -1.8
(0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.8) (0.5) (1.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6)
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.00
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -1.7 -1.8 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 -1.9 -2.2 -2.0
(0.5) (0.3) (0.7) (0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.3)
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dependent Variable is Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 350.0 332.3 349.1 363.7 298.1 308.3 437.5 432.0 278.5 359.0
(75.4) (37.3) (70.6) (25.6) (80.2) (51.7) (133.6) (78.5) (68.2) (48.5)
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Number of IVs 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 10 10
F-Statistic (First stage) 13.1 46.7 27.0 133.6 12.2 17.1 4.7 14.9 6.6 5.7
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.0 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1 -2.0 -2.1 -1.7 -1.2 -1.7 -1.2
(0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6)
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -2.0 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.6 -1.9 -1.6
(0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3)
Dependent Variable is Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 323.5 363.3 324.1 359.6 324.0 360.0 248.5 311.0 249.4 309.6
(54.6) (26.9) (55.8) (25.5) (55.8) (25.6) (52.3) (47.1) (52.3) (47.0)
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Notes: Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates of democracy’s effect on mean GDP growth rates in 2001-2019, GDP growth rates in 2020,
and Covid-19-related deaths per million, using five different IV strategies. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero
and standard deviation one. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the
1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and
columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber,
and wheat). The reported F-statistics are from the first-stage regressions of the IVs against the democracy index in 2019. The corresponding
first-stage coefficients are in Appendix Table A5. Panel B reports the OLS estimates. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while
columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density,
and median age. For outcomes in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable
definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: OLS
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -4.8 -5.3 -105.3 -97.8 -101.6 -90.6 -1.4 -0.8 -2.1 -1.5
(1.4) (1.6) (16.0) (26.7) (24.6) (36.8) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6)
N 154 154 163 163 163 163 162 162 160 160
Panel B: Instrument for Democracy by Settler Mortality
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -5.3 -11.4 -148.5 -169.0 -152.4 -220.0 -1.8 -3.5 -2.7 -3.4
(1.7) (2.8) (19.5) (51.9) (20.1) (64.7) (0.8) (4.8) (0.3) (0.7)
N 72 72 77 77 77 77 76 76 77 77
Panel C: Instrument for Democracy by Population Density in 1500s
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -6.3 -11.2 -152.2 -179.9 -143.8 -175.3 -2.7 -8.8 -2.8 -3.6
(1.5) (2.2) (36.8) (55.6) (27.8) (47.4) (1.2) (8.4) (0.5) (0.7)
N 84 84 89 89 89 89 87 87 87 87
Panel D: Instrument for Democracy by Legal Origin
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -5.0 -8.6 -122.9 -67.0 -142.8 -161.5 -0.2 -19.6 -2.3 -1.8
(2.0) (4.2) (24.9) (113.9) (27.6) (91.9) (0.8) (40.2) (0.4) (1.5)
N 88 88 93 93 93 93 91 91 91 91
Panel E: Instrument for Democracy by Language
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -7.8 -8.4 -134.8 -139.9 -108.4 -121.4 -2.7 -2.8 -1.4 -1.4
(1.8) (1.6) (28.1) (22.6) (41.7) (34.1) (0.9) (1.0) (1.0) (0.6)
N 128 128 136 136 136 136 135 135 134 134
Panel F: Instrument for Democracy by Crops and Minerals
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -6.9 -8.8 -146.0 -142.5 -146.0 -141.0 -2.3 -1.3 -2.8 -1.9
(1.2) (1.4) (30.3) (20.7) (27.8) (31.9) (0.6) (0.9) (0.5) (0.7)
N 133 133 142 142 142 142 140 140 139 139
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: This table reports the OLS (Panel A) and 2SLS regression (Panels B-F) estimates of democracy’s effect on potential mechanisms in 2001-2019.
The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The dependent variables are the mean of each of the
following variables in 2001-2019: investment share in GDP (%) (columns 1-2), the import value index (2000=100) (columns 3-4), the export value
index (2000=100) (columns 5-6), manufacturing, value added (annual % growth) (columns 7-8), and services, value added (annual % growth) (columns
9-10). For IVs, Panel B uses log European settler mortality, Panel C uses log population density in the 1500s, Panel D uses British legal origin, Panel E
uses the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and Panel F uses the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee,
copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the
following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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A Appendix
A.1 Extending Easterly and Levine (2003)’s Dataset
Since Easterly and Levine (2003)’s dataset only covers 71 countries, we replicate their data gathering process
to extend their dataset to 152 countries. For the dummy variables for crop production in 1990, we first use the
values from the replication file. Then, we replace the missing values using data from the Food and Agriculture
Association of the United Nations (2020) on crop production in 1990. This data is equivalent to the data that the
authors describe in their work. Analogously, for the dummy variables for minerals production in 1990, we first
use the replication file’s values and then replace the missing values using production data for 1990 from World
Bureau of Metal Statistics (2019a) and World Bureau of Metal Statistics (2019b).
A.2 Policy Mechanisms Behind Democracy’s Effect in 2020
Does having a stronger democracy cause worse economic and public health outcomes during the Covid pandemic?
Media and policy discussions point to the speed, coverage, and severity of containment policies as potential
proximate mechanisms. Indeed, Paul Krugman blames “catastrophically slow and inadequate” responses by the
US government for its failure.14 We explore whether this differential in policy responses explains democracy’s
negative effect. Our findings suggest that a key channel for the negative impact of democracy is weaker and
narrower containment policies at the beginning of the outbreak. In contrast, the speed of containment policies
appears to be less important.
To measure the severity of policy, we use the Containment Health Index at the 10th confirmed case of Covid-
19.15 To quantify how widely initial responses cover aspects of civilian life, we look at the percentage of 13
domains in which the government introduced containment measures at the 10th Covid-19 case. The domains
are schools, workplaces, public events, gatherings, public transport, stay-at-home requirements, domestic travel,
international travel, public information campaigns, testing, contact tracing, facial coverings, and vaccinations. To
assess policy speed, we consider the number of days between the 10th confirmed case and the introduction of any
containment policy.16
For each policy response mechanism M (severity, coverage, or speed of containment response), we estimate
the following 2SLS equations:
Mi = η +ρDemocracyi +X ′i φ +ωi (5)
First Stage: Democracyi = ζ +Z′iβ +X
′
i δ +υi. (6)
This approach is similar to Acemoglu et al. (2003)’s, which evaluates channels behind democracy’ effects using
14Krugman, Paul. 2020. “3 Rules for the Trump Pandemic.” New York Times. March 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/
opinion/trump-coronavirus.html
15We get similar results when we use the index at the 100th confirmed case or the index’s mean during 2020.
16We get similar results with the 100th confirmed case and January 1st, 2020 as the start date. The introduction date of any containment
policy is the date when the Containment Health Index becomes positive.
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similar 2SLS.
Table A20 summarizes the results from this analysis.17 Panel A shows that democracy causes less severe
responses at the 10th confirmed case of Covid-19. The median estimate is that a standard deviation increase in
democracy causes the Containment Health Index to decrease by 0.4 standard deviations, which corresponds to
20% of the mean. Democracy also narrows containment policies’ scope. The median estimate in Panel B suggests
that a standard deviation increase in democracy causes a 9.3 percentage-point decrease in the coverage of initial
policy. On the other hand, democracy does not appear to cause slower responses. In fact, in Panel C, all columns
predict that democracy causes faster responses. This leads to the bottom line that the severity and coverage of
initial containment policies is a more important mechanism for the adverse effect of democracy than their speed.18
17We get similar results with alternative democracy indices, weighting, and sample definitions.
18To quantify the significance of these channels, we conduct causal mediation analysis in Appendix Table A21.
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A.3 Additional Results
Table A1: Additional Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Outcomes Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1981-1990 133 2.8 2.6 −3.8 2.6 10.9
(Libya) (Norway) (Botswana)
Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1991-2000 162 3.4 4.8 −9.3 3.1 44.8
(Moldova) (Republic of the Congo) (Equatorial Guinea)
Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2010 164 4.5 2.8 −3.4 4.0 16.5
(Zimbabwe) (Namibia) (Equatorial Guinea)
Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2011-2020 164 2.5 2.5 −11.6 2.5 9.2
(Venezuela) (Iceland) (Ethiopia)
Excess Deaths Per Million in 2020 72 988.2 870.4 −434.8 940.3 3,326.2
(New Zealand) (Brazil) (Armenia)
Treatments Democracy Index (Polity, 2000) 153 0.0 1.0 −2.1 0.4 1.0
(Bhutan) (Bangladesh) (Australia)
Democracy Index (Polity, 2018) 156 0.0 1.0 −2.4 0.4 0.9
(Bahrain) (Armenia) (Australia)
Democracy Index (Freedom House, 2003) 161 0.0 1.0 −2.2 −0.01 1.5
(Iraq) (Mozambique) (Luxembourg)
Democracy Index (Freedom House, 2019) 159 0.0 1.0 −1.9 0.1 1.5
(Eritrea) (Georgia) (Finland)
Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006) 158 0.0 1.0 −1.8 0.1 1.9
(Central African Republic) (Albania) (Sweden)
Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019) 154 0.0 1.0 −2.0 0.1 2.0
(Dem. Rep. of the Congo) (Malawi) (Norway)
Controls GDP (Current USD, Billions, 1980) 130 85.4 291.2 0.03 7.6 2,857.3
(Equatorial Guinea) (Guatemala) (United States)
GDP (Current USD, Billions, 1990) 139 167.8 615.1 0.1 9.5 5,963.1
(Sao Tome and Principe) (Sri Lanka) (United States)
GDP (Current USD, Billions, 2000) 164 203.5 920.0 0.1 11.7 10,252.4
(Sao Tome and Principe) (El Salvador) (United States)
GDP (Current USD, Billions, 2010) 164 398.1 1,406.6 0.2 37.9 14,992.0
(Sao Tome and Principe) (Burma) (United States)
GDP Per Capita (Current USD, 1980) 126 4,344.1 6,240.2 123.4 1,543.3 40,014.6
(Equatorial Guinea) (Dominican Republic) (United Arab Emirates)
GDP Per Capita (Current USD, 1990) 138 5,768.2 8,617.1 87.2 1,323.6 39,888.2
(Sudan) (Ivory Coast) (Switzerland)
GDP Per Capita (Current USD, 2000) 163 6,521.7 10,155.6 128.6 1,675.8 49,183.4
(Ethiopia) (Paraguay) (Luxembourg)
GDP Per Capita (Current USD, 2010) 164 12,888.6 18,546.9 231.5 4,604.7 106,177.0
(Burundi) (Ecuador) (Luxembourg)
GDP Per Capita (Current USD, 2019) 164 14,438.6 20,184.2 257.4 5,879.9 115,838.8
(Burundi) (Jamaica) (Luxembourg)
Population (Millions, 2000) 164 36.6 133.4 0.1 8.2 1,290.6
(Seychelles) (Azerbaijan) (China)
Population (Millions, 2019) 164 46.5 160.0 0.1 10.2 1,439.3
(Seychelles) (Azerbaijan) (China)
Mean Temperature (◦c, 1971-1980) 164 18.0 8.5 −7.4 21.5 28.2
(Canada) (Australia) (Mali)
Mean Temperature (◦c, 1981-1990) 164 18.3 8.5 −7.0 21.9 28.6
(Canada) (Botswana) (Mali)
Mean Temperature (◦c, 1991-2000) 164 18.6 8.4 −6.2 22.2 28.6
(Canada) (Angola) (Mali)
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Table A1: Additional Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Mean Temperature (◦c, 2001-2010) 164 18.9 8.3 −5.8 22.6 29.1
(Canada) (Iraq) (Mali)
Mean Precipitation (mm per Month, 1971-1980) 164 92.6 64.5 3.0 81.6 260.3
(Egypt) (Angola) (Costa Rica)
Mean Precipitation (mm per Month, 1981-1990) 164 91.3 64.1 3.1 79.4 256.5
(Egypt) (Albania) (Papua New Guinea)
Mean Precipitation (mm per Month, 1991-2000) 164 91.4 63.8 2.7 78.2 252.7
(Egypt) (Angola) (Malaysia)
Mean Precipitation (mm per Month, 2001-2010) 164 94.1 66.4 2.2 81.6 265.7
(Egypt) (Angola) (Malaysia)
Population Density (No. of People per km2, 1980) 164 108.7 294.5 1.1 41.5 3,445.3
(Mongolia) (Malaysia) (Singapore)
Population Density (No. of People per km2, 1990) 164 129.1 363.0 1.4 50.4 4,304.2
(Mongolia) (Cambodia) (Singapore)
Population Density (No. of People Per km2, 2000) 164 152.6 475.6 1.5 59.8 5,755.5
(Mongolia) (Benin) (Singapore)
Population Density (No. of People Per km2, 2010) 164 182.8 605.2 1.8 72.6 7,330.2
(Mongolia) (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Singapore)
Median Age (1980) 164 22.3 6.3 15.0 19.2 36.5
(Kenya) (Haiti) (Germany)
Median Age (1990) 164 23.6 7.2 14 20.8 38
(Yemen) (Lebanon) (Sweden)
Median Age (2000) 164 25.6 8.0 15 22.7 41
(Burundi) (Guyana) (Japan)
Median Age (2010) 164 27.9 8.6 15.0 26.1 44.7
(Niger) (Burma) (Japan)
Alternative Mechanisms in 2001-2019 Mean Tax Revenue Share of GDP (2001-2019) 132 16.6 6.6 0.3 16.0 37.0
(United Arab Emirates) (Kenya) (Malta)
Mean Primary School Enrollment Rate (net %, 2001-2019) 156 88.2 11.9 40.6 92.1 99.7
(Liberia) (Qatar) (Singapore)
Mean Secondary School Enrollment Rate (net %, 2001-2019) 148 65.8 26.6 10.0 76.2 99.7
(Angola) (Thailand) (Singapore)
Mean Child Mortality Rate Per 1000 (2001-2019) 164 28.2 25.1 2.1 18.1 108.2
(Iceland) (Brazil) (Sierra Leone)
Policy Responses in 2020 Containment Health Index at 10th Covid-19 Case 155 1.8 1.0 0.0 1.7 3.9
(Algeria) (Vietnam) (Djibouti)
Coverage of Containment Policy at 10th Covid-19 Case 156 48.9 23.6 0.0 46.2 92.3
(Algeria) (Azerbaijan) (Bhutan)
Days Between 10th Covid-19 Case Until Any Containment Measure 156 −42.8 33.0 −270.0 −40.0 34.0
(Solomon Islands) (Azerbaijan) (Thailand)
Notes: Parentheses contain country names corresponding to the minimum, median and maximum values of each variable. When we observe multiple countries corresponding to the same minimum, median or maximum, we choose
the first country in alphabetical order. When we do not find a country that corresponds exactly to the median, we choose the country with the closest value. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A2: Data Sources and Description
Variable Data Source Short Description
Outcomes Mean GDP Growth Rate in
2001-2019
International Monetary Fund (2021) Mean real GDP growth rates between 2001 to 2019.




Center for Systems Science and En-
gineering at Johns Hopkins University
(2021)
Total number of deaths per million attributed to
Covid-19 between 2020/01/22 (earliest available in
dataset) and 2020/12/31.
Excess Deaths Per Million
in 2020
Glattino et al. (2021); Karlinsky and
Kobak (2021)
Number of deaths per million between 2020/01/01
and 2020/12/31 in excess of the the baseline num-
ber of deaths we might normally have expected in
2020. The model to calculate the baseline fits a
linear trend to years to adjust from long-term in-
creases or decreases in deaths and fixed effects for
each week or month.
Treatments Democracy Index (V-Dem) Coppedge et al. (2021) The electoral democracy index from the Varieties
of Democracy project. It is on a 0-1 scale and ag-
gregates indices measuring freedom of association,
clean elections, freedom of expression, elected of-
ficials, and suffrage.
Democracy Index (Polity) Center for Systemic Peace (2018) Index measuring the level of democracy on a 21-
point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy)
to 10 (consolidated democracy).
Democracy Index (Freedom
House)
Freedom House (2020) Index measuring the degree of democratic freedom
by taking the sum of the political rights (0 to 40)
and civil liberties (0 to 60) scales. Ranges from 0




Economist Intelligence Unit (2021) Index measuring the state of democracy. Ranges




GDP (Current USD, Bil-
lions)
The World Bank Group (2021b) Gross domestic product at purchasing power par-
ity in current U.S. billion dollars. GDP is the sum
of gross value added by all resident producers in
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products.
It is calculated without making deductions for de-
preciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and
degradation of natural resources. Dollar figures for
GDP are converted from domestic currencies using
single year official exchange rates.
GDP Per Capita (Current
USD)
The World Bank Group (2021c) Gross domestic product divided by midyear popu-
lation. Data are in current U.S. dollars.
Population (Millions) United Nations Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Population
Division (2019)
Total population in millions.
Absolute Latitude Google Dataset Publishing Language
(2021)
Absolute value of the latitude of the centroid of
each country (i.e., a measure of distance from the
equator).
Mean Temperature The World Bank Group (2021a) The average of average monthly temperature in de-
grees Celcius.
Mean Precipitation The World Bank Group (2021a) The average of average monthly precipitation in
millimeters.
Population Density United Nations Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Population
Division (2019)
The number of people divided by land area, mea-
sured in square kilometers.
Median Age United Nations Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Population
Division (2019)
UN projections of the median age of the population.
Diabetes Prevalence International Diabetes Federation
(2019)
Percentage of population with diabetes aged 20 to
79.
IVs Log European Settler Mor-
tality
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001)
The log of annualized deaths per thousand mean
strength of European settlers between the seven-
teenth and nineteenth century.
Log Population Density in
1500s
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) The log of the population density in the 1500s mea-
sured as the number of inhabitants per square kilo-
meter.
British Legal Origin LaPorta, de Silanes and Shleifer
(2008)
Dummy variables coded 1 if the country’s legal ori-
gin is British, and 0 otherwise.
Fraction Speaking English Hall and Jones (1999) The fraction of the population speaking English as
a mother tongue in 1992.
Fraction Speaking European Hall and Jones (1999) The fraction of the population speaking English,
French, German, Portuguese or Spanish as a




Easterly and Levine (2003); Food and
Agriculture Association of the United
Nations (2020)
Dummy variables coded 1 if the country produced
any of the particular commodity in 1990, and 0 oth-
erwise.
Copper, Silver Easterly and Levine (2003); World
Bureau of Metal Statistics (2019a,b)
Dummy variables coded 1 if the country mined any
of the particular commodity in 1990, and 0 other-
wise.
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Table A2: Data Sources and Description




Investment Share of GDP The World Bank Group (2021d) The ratio of total investment in current local cur-
rency and GDP in current local currency. Invest-
ment is measured by the total value of the gross
fixed capital formation and changes in inventories
and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a
unit or sector.
Import Value Index The World Bank Group (2021d) The current value of imports converted to U.S. dol-
lars and expressed as a percentage of the average
for the base period (2000).
Export Value Index The World Bank Group (2021d) The current value of exports converted to U.S. dol-
lars and expressed as a percentage of the average
for the base period (2000).
Manufacturing Value Added
(Annual % Growth)
The World Bank Group (2021d) Annual growth rate for manufacturing value added
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Manufactur-
ing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions
15-37. Value added is the net output of a sector
after adding up all outputs and subtracting interme-
diate inputs. It is calculated without making deduc-
tions for depreciation of fabricated assets or deple-
tion and degradation of natural resources.
Services Value Added (An-
nual % Growth)
The World Bank Group (2021d) Annual growth rate for value added in services
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are
based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Services cor-
respond to ISIC divisions 50-99. They include
value added in wholesale and retail trade (includ-
ing hotels and restaurants), transport, and govern-
ment, financial, professional, and personal services
such as education, health care, and real estate ser-
vices. Also included are imputed bank service
charges, import duties, and any statistical discrep-
ancies noted by national compilers as well as dis-
crepancies arising from rescaling. Value added is
the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs
and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated
without making deductions for depreciation of fab-
ricated assets or depletion and degradation of natu-
ral resources.
Tex Revenue Share of GDP The World Bank Group (2021d) The ratio of tax revenues in current local currency
to GDP in current local currency. Tax revenue
refers to compulsory transfers to the central gov-
ernment for public purposes. Certain compulsory
transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social
security contributions are excluded.
Primary School Enrollment The World Bank Group (2021d) The ratio of children of official school age who are
enrolled in primary school to the population of the
corresponding official school age.
Secondary School Enroll-
ment
The World Bank Group (2021d) The ratio of the number of students of official
school age enrolled in secondary education to the
population of the age group which officially corre-
sponds to secondary education.
Child Mortality Rate The World Bank Group (2021d) The number of infants who die before reaching one






at 10th Covid-19 Case
Blavatnik School of Government at
the University of Oxford (2021)
A measure of the strictness of government re-
sponses. Calculated by taking the average of 13
sub-scores which record severity in a specific do-
main on an ordinal scale (for example, the school
sub-index is on a 0 (no measure) to 4 (require clos-
ing) scale) and subtracts 0.5 if it is targeted. It is
scaled to take a value between 0 and 100. The
domains are schools, workplaces, public events,
gatherings, public transport, stay-at-home require-
ments, domestic travel, international travel, public
information campaigns, testing, contact tracing, fa-
cial coverings, and vaccinations. We use the index
at the date when the 10th case of Covid-19 is con-
firmed.
Coverage of Containment
Measures at 10th Covid-19
Case
Blavatnik School of Government at
the University of Oxford (2021)
The percentage of the 13 domains in which the data
records any policy introduction at the date when the
10th case of Covid-19 is confirmed.
Days between 10th Covid-
19 Case and Any Contain-
ment Measure
Blavatnik School of Government at
the University of Oxford (2021)
The number of days between the date when the 10th
Covid-19 case is confirmed and the date when the
containment health index becomes positive.
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Figure A1: Correlation Between Democracy and Economic Growth by Decade
(a) Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1981-1990 (b) Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1991-2000
(c) Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2010 (d) Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2011-2020
Notes: Panels (a)-(d) show the relationship between democracy and the mean GDP growth rates in four periods: 1981-1990, 1991-2000,
2001-2010, and 2011-2019. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The size of each
circle (country) is proportional to its baseline GDP. The colors depend on the level of the democracy index (warmer colors for democracy and
darker colors for autocracies). The line is the fitted line from a univariate OLS regression of the outcome against the democracy index that
weights observations by baseline GDP. The shaded area corresponds to the 95% confidence interval. Variable definitions and data sources are
in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A3: Correlation Between Democracy and Economic Growth With Control for Baseline GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -1.7 -1.2 -1.3 -1.0 -1.7 -1.1 -1.2 -1.1
(0.4) (0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4)
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -1.9 -1.6 -2.9 -2.6 -1.9 -1.8 -2.5 -2.6
(0.5) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5)
Baseline Controls Other Than Baseline GDP 3 3 3 3
Baseline GDP Per Capita Control 3 3 3 3
Baseline Total GDP Control 3 3 3 3
N 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions of GDP growth rates on the democracy index with additional controls for baseline
GDP per capita and total GDP. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 2,
4, 6, 8 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age.
For the GDP growth rate in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 additionally control for baseline GDP per
capita. Columns 5, 6, 7, 8 additionally control for baseline total GDP. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data
sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A4: Summary of the Direction of Potential Bias in the IV Estimates
IV Base Sample Cov(Z,Democracy) Cov(Z,PotentialOmittedVar)





N = 77 (countries for-
merly under European
rule with data available)
Negative (Higher settler mortality
led settlers to establish extractive
institutions, which correspond to
lower levels of democracy)
Likely negative (Worse disease en-




sity in 1500s IV
N = 89 (countries for-
merly under European
rule with data available)
Negative (Higher population den-
sity at the beginning of colo-
nial rule led European colonizers
to establish extractive institutions,
which correspond to lower levels of
democracy)
Likely positive (Higher popula-
tion density may positively affect
growth through higher returns to




N = 93 (countries for-
merly under European
rule with data available)
Positive (British colonial rule led
to the establishment of a common-
law legal system, which is corre-
lated with less restrictions on indi-
vidual freedoms and higher levels
of democracy)
Likely positive (Being formerly
subjected to British rule instead
of other European countries such
as French, Spanish, Portuguese, or
German rule may lead to greater
advantages in an Anglo-centric






N = 136 (all countries
with data available)
Positive (The fraction of the pop-
ulation speaking English or Euro-
pean corresponds to the extent of
Western influence, which is pos-
itively related to higher levels of
democracy)
Likely positive (Higher fractions of
the population speaking English or
a European language may result in





N = 142 (all countries
with data available)
Depends on the commodity Depends on the commodity Depends on the commod-
ity
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Table A5: First-Stage Regression Estimates of IVs’ Effects on Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable is Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019)
Log European Settler Mortality -1.0 -1.3
(0.3) (0.2)
Log Population Density in 1500s -0.5 -0.5
(0.09) (0.04)
British Legal Origin 2.0 2.0
(0.6) (0.5)
Fraction Speaking English -0.04 0.7
(0.2) (0.5)






















F-Statistic (First stage) 13.1 46.7 27.0 133.6 12.2 17.1 4.7 14.9 6.6 5.7
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Notes: This table reports the first-stage regression estimates of the effect of the five different sets of IVs on democracy levels
in 2019. It complements Table 2’s 2SLS estimates of democracy’s effects on outcomes. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while columns 2, 4, 6,
8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density,
median age, and diabetes prevalence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in
Appendix Table A2.
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Table A6: GDP and Covid-19 Deaths After Accounting for Political Regimes’ Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Africa Asia Europe N. America Oceania S. America
Panel A: GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Observed Mean 4.3 5.5 2.8 2.8 3.1 2.9
Political Regimes’ Effect 1.2 1.5 -1.9 -1.3 -0.6 -1.5
(Observed Mean) - (Political Regimes’ Effect) 3.2 3.9 4.6 4.2 3.8 4.4
Panel B: Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Observed Mean -3.8 -4.5 -4.8 -7.6 -7.0 -5.0
Political Regimes’ Effect 0.7 1.2 -1.3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9
(Observed Mean) - (Political Regimes’ Effect) -4.5 -5.7 -3.6 -6.9 -6.2 -4.1
Panel C: Total Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million in 2020
Observed Mean 51.5 138.5 678.5 364.8 7.4 594.8
Political Regimes’ Effect -138.2 -248.7 267.5 160.2 165.5 180.6
(Observed Mean) - (Political Regimes’ Effect) 189.7 387.2 411.0 204.6 -158.1 414.1
N 52 38 42 14 6 12
Notes: This table reports each continent’s mean GDP growth rates in 2001-2019 (Panel A), mean GDP growth rates in 2020 (Panel B),
and total Covid-19-related deaths per million (Panel C) before and after subtracting the estimated effect of democracy in Table 2’s column
1. To calculate the estimated effect of democracy for each continent, we multiply the coefficient estimated in Table 2’s column 1 with the
democracy index (normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one) for each country and take the average across the countries in the
continent.
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Table A7: Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth With Control for Baseline GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: No Control for Baseline GDP
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.2 -3.3 -2.3 -3.4 -1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -2.4 -1.8
(0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.8) (0.5) (1.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6)
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -1.7 -1.8 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.5 -1.9 -1.9 -2.2 -2.0
(0.5) (0.3) (0.7) (0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.3)
Panel B: Control for Baseline GDP Per Capita
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -1.6 -3.3 -2.5 -3.4 2.5 22.9 -1.9 -1.0 -2.3 -1.4
(1.0) (3.6) (0.7) (1.1) (6.2) (95.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.8) (0.7)
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -4.8 -5.6 -2.9 -3.2 -4.5 -8.7 -3.8 -4.3 -3.9 -4.1
(1.4) (1.5) (0.6) (0.9) (1.4) (21.4) (0.8) (1.2) (0.5) (0.7)
Panel C: Control for Baseline Total GDP
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.2 -3.6 -2.5 -3.4 -1.1 0.2 -1.5 -1.2 -2.6 -1.9
(0.4) (1.2) (0.5) (0.8) (1.5) (3.1) (1.0) (0.7) (0.5) (0.8)
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -2.2 -2.2 -1.9 -1.9 -2.3 -2.0 -2.3 -2.4 -2.2 -2.3
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (0.3) (0.4)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls Other Than Baseline GDP 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 135 135 141 141
Notes: This table compares the 2SLS regression estimates of democracy’s effect on the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-2019 and the GDP growth
rate in 2020 without controls for baseline GDP (Panel A), with additional controls for baseline GDP per capita (Panel B), and with additional
controls for baseline total GDP (Panel C). The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 2,
4, 6, 8, and 10 also have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median
age. For the GDP growth rate in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns
3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the
fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver,
sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). The sample sizes are slightly different from those in Table 2 because this table uses only observations for which
all GDP per capita and GDP growth rate data are available. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in
Appendix Table A2.
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Table A8: Democracy’s Effect on Change in GDP Growth Rates Between 2019 and 2020
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable is the Difference in the Annual GDP Growth Rate Between 2019 and 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8
(0.4) (0.2) (0.7) (0.4) (0.5) (0.3) (0.6) (0.4) (0.5) (0.3)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS regression estimates of democracy’s effect on (GDP growth rates in 2020)-(GDP growth rates in
2019). The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no
controls, while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation,
population density, median age, and diabetes prevalence. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4
use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and
the fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize,
millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in
Appendix Table A2.
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Table A9: 2SLS Regression with Continent Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -1.4 -2.4 -1.0 -1.4 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2 -6.7 -3.0 -1.7
(0.8) (1.8) (0.8) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (1.2) (7.5) (0.6) (0.6)
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -3.4 -3.0 1.2 -1.0 -3.4 -1.7 -3.0 -4.2 -2.4 -1.4
(2.6) (1.3) (4.0) (1.6) (2.1) (1.3) (1.9) (3.6) (0.7) (1.4)
Dependent Variable is Covid-19 Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 220.7 194.0 -44.9 118.3 92.1 153.8 206.0 -349.2 32.7 33.1
(106.6) (44.0) (201.5) (76.4) (30.9) (42.2) (216.3) (390.4) (37.7) (118.2)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS regression estimates of democracy’s effect on the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-2019, the GDP growth rate
in 2020, and Covid-19 deaths per million in 2020 that adds dummy variables for each continent (Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania,
and South America) as controls. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1,
3, 5, 7, and 9 only control for continents, while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 also have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean
temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age. For outcomes in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. For IVs,
columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British
legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to
grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Panel A: Democracy Index for 2019
V-Dem (2019) 1
Polity (2018) 0.860 1
Freedom House (2019) 0.946 0.842 1
Economist Intelligence Unit (2019) 0.894 0.781 0.947 1
Panel B: Democracy Index for 2000
V-Dem (2000) 1
Polity (2000) 0.900 1
Freedom House (2003) 0.935 0.888 1
Economist Intelligence Unit (2006) 0.910 0.853 0.919 1
Notes: This table reports the pairwise correlations among the V-Dem, Polity, Freedom House, and Economist Intelligence
Unit’s democracy indices for democracy levels in 2019 (Panel A) and 2000 (Panel B). The publication year of each index is in
parentheses. When data for democracy levels in 2019 or 2000 are unavailable, we use the index from the nearest available year.
Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A11: 2SLS Regression with Alternative Democracy Indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.2 -3.4 -2.4 -3.4 -1.8 -1.5 -1.5 -1.4 -2.5 -1.9
(0.3) (0.8) (0.4) (0.8) (0.5) (1.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6)
Democracy Index (Polity, 2000) -2.6 -2.9 -2.9 -3.9 -2.0 -1.2 -2.0 -1.7 -3.1 -2.4
(0.3) (0.5) (0.6) (1.1) (0.5) (1.5) (1.0) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5)
Democracy Index (Freedom House, 2003) -2.1 -2.7 -2.5 -3.9 -1.7 -1.2 -1.5 -1.4 -2.3 -1.8
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.9) (0.6) (1.4) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.7)
Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006) -2.3 -2.9 -2.8 -4.8 -1.8 -1.4 -1.9 -1.7 -2.4 -1.8
(0.5) (0.7) (0.6) (1.4) (0.7) (1.7) (1.1) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8)
Panel B Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -1.7 -1.9 -1.5 -1.8 -1.8 -1.5 -2.2 -1.8 -2.2 -2.1
(0.5) (0.3) (0.7) (0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6) (0.3)
Democracy Index (Polity, 2018) -2.2 -2.3 -2.0 -2.3 -2.1 -1.8 -3.2 -2.8 -2.8 -2.5
(0.4) (0.3) (0.6) (0.3) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (0.4) (0.4)
Democracy Index (Freedom House, 2019) -1.9 -2.3 -1.8 -2.2 -1.9 -1.7 -2.6 -2.2 -2.5 -2.4
(0.6) (0.3) (0.8) (0.3) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.4)
Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019) -1.8 -2.2 -1.7 -2.2 -1.9 -1.7 -2.5 -2.1 -2.5 -2.4
(0.6) (0.4) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0.4)
Panel C Dependent Variable is Covid-19 Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 355.7 339.0 356.1 371.3 303.7 314.8 359.7 432.1 283.2 365.7
(76.6) (38.0) (71.8) (26.2) (81.8) (52.7) (97.0) (74.6) (69.6) (49.5)
Democracy Index (Polity, 2018) 468.4 412.9 486.9 478.1 359.8 367.1 492.6 634.3 320.3 400.9
(151.2) (62.0) (167.8) (60.6) (134.2) (81.7) (199.1) (172.7) (106.3) (87.3)
Democracy Index (Freedom House, 2019) 402.2 403.4 427.0 465.9 328.9 354.7 425.5 525.7 303.4 394.5
(98.5) (52.9) (109.5) (46.9) (107.5) (77.6) (131.6) (109.9) (91.7) (70.2)
Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019) 380.4 391.1 415.1 469.2 317.8 348.9 407.9 503.5 310.0 414.3
(94.9) (57.6) (106.3) (47.0) (105.9) (81.5) (117.1) (104.0) (84.9) (66.6)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language & trade crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 74 74 85 85 89 89 126 126 131 131
Notes: This table compares the results of 2SLS regressions on the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-2019 (Panel A), the GDP growth rate in 2020 (Panel B), and Covid-19-related
deaths per million in 2020 (Panel C) using democracy indices by V-Dem, Polity, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit. When data for the democracy index does not
exist for the baseline year, we use the value from the closest year. We normalize all indices to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls,
while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age. For outcomes
in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5
and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine
minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). The estimates in this table are slightly different from those in Table 2 because this table
uses only observations for which all of the democracy indices are available. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table
A2.
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Table A12: 2SLS Regression with Alternative Weightings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (Weighting: GDP) -2.2 -3.3 -2.3 -3.4 -1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -2.4 -1.8
(0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.8) (0.5) (1.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6)
Democracy Index (Weighting: Population) -1.5 -2.2 -3.9 -4.4 -0.9 -1.0 -3.0 -2.8 -3.3 -1.7
(0.9) (1.0) (2.2) (1.5) (1.0) (1.0) (0.7) (0.7) (1.0) (0.7)
Democracy Index (Weighting: None) -1.4 0.9 -1.6 -1.9 -1.3 -2.1 -1.4 -1.5 -1.2 -0.7
(0.6) (5.1) (0.4) (0.7) (2.3) (5.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.7)
Panel B Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (Weighting: GDP) -1.7 -1.8 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 -1.9 -2.2 -2.0
(0.5) (0.3) (0.7) (0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.3)
Democracy Index (Weighting: Population) -5.2 -2.8 -1.2 -2.0 -5.0 -3.5 -2.4 -2.2 -2.6 -3.1
(3.7) (1.4) (1.9) (0.8) (3.0) (1.6) (1.1) (0.7) (1.3) (0.9)
Democracy Index (Weighting: None) -5.2 -73.2 -0.8 1.1 6.8 7.0 -2.8 -2.2 -2.8 -4.2
(4.0) (554.4) (2.9) (4.9) (8.1) (7.0) (1.9) (3.0) (1.1) (2.2)
Panel C Dependent Variable is Covid-19 Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (Weighting: GDP) 350.0 332.3 349.1 363.7 298.1 308.3 437.5 432.0 278.5 359.0
(75.4) (37.3) (70.6) (25.6) (80.2) (51.7) (133.6) (78.5) (68.2) (48.5)
Democracy Index (Weighting: Population) 514.4 305.5 414.7 391.9 41.1 155.3 467.2 433.6 307.2 291.7
(267.2) (56.1) (113.3) (52.0) (170.5) (132.8) (88.3) (65.0) (88.6) (62.6)
Democracy Index (Weighting: None) 366.8 -271.4 208.6 166.3 -367.1 -413.1 300.4 296.4 273.9 -154.1
(150.7) (3870.6) (73.3) (88.4) (340.0) (275.2) (73.2) (132.8) (65.2) (130.4)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Notes: This table compares the results of 2SLS regressions on the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-2019 (Panel A), the GDP growth rate in 2020 (Panel B), and Covid-19-
related deaths per million in 2020 (Panel C) with weighting of observations by baseline GDP, weighting by baseline population, and no weighting. The Democracy Index
(V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline
controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age. For outcomes in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. For
IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and
8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper,
maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A13: 2SLS Regression Excluding the US and China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.2 -3.3 -2.3 -3.4 -1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -2.4 -1.8
(0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.8) (0.5) (1.6) (0.9) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6)
Include US & China? 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -1.5 -0.5 -2.3 -5.1 4.6 -20.1 -0.8 -1.2 -1.7 -0.08
(0.8) (3.0) (1.3) (4.9) (8.8) (62.2) (1.2) (0.7) (0.5) (1.0)
Include US & China? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
N 75 75 87 87 91 91 134 134 140 140
Panel B Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -1.7 -1.8 -1.5 -1.7 -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 -1.9 -2.2 -2.0
(0.5) (0.3) (0.7) (0.3) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.3)
Include US & China? 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -1.5 -22.7 0.2 3.1 4.0 15.7 -2.4 -3.0 -1.8 -3.7
(2.1) (202.7) (1.4) (4.1) (20.2) (82.3) (1.2) (1.3) (0.9) (2.0)
Include US & China? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
N 75 75 87 87 91 91 134 134 140 140
Panel C Dependent Variable is Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 350.0 332.3 349.1 363.7 298.1 308.3 437.5 432.0 278.5 359.0
(75.4) (37.3) (70.6) (25.6) (80.2) (51.7) (133.6) (78.5) (68.2) (48.5)
Include US & China? 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 77 77 89 89 93 93 136 136 142 142
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -64.2 16004.9 205.7 364.1 -4976.4 -9580.3 449.7 534.6 208.1 150.2
(197.2) (149508.4) (150.6) (274.2) (21202.9) (42301.8) (207.6) (219.3) (117.3) (143.1)
Include US & China? 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
N 75 75 87 87 91 91 134 134 140 140
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: This table compares the results of 2SLS regressions on the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-2019 (Panel A), the GDP growth rate in 2020 (Panel B),
and Covid-19-related deaths per million in 2020 (Panel C) under two sample definitions (include the US and China vs. exclude the US and China). The
Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while columns 2, 4, 6,
8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age. For outcomes
in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in
the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and columns 9
and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A14: 2SLS Regression Excluding Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.1 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9 -2.0 -2.0 -0.9 -0.9 -2.1 -2.2
(0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (1.0) (1.0) (0.4) (0.4)
N 72 75 84 86 87 86 127 126 133 134
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -1.7 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -2.1 -2.1
(0.5) (0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.6) (0.6)
N 75 75 86 86 90 90 134 134 137 136
Dependent Variable is Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 355.9 350.0 350.1 349.1 301.5 300.4 442.6 440.9 273.1 276.5
(74.5) (75.2) (69.6) (70.5) (78.6) (78.7) (136.3) (135.8) (71.3) (70.0)
N 76 74 88 88 92 89 132 132 138 138
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: This table shows the results of 2SLS regressions on the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-2019, the GDP growth rate in 2020, and Covid-
19-related deaths per million in 2020 excluding countries with a standardized residual above 1.96 or below -1.96. For each 2SLS regression, we
run the baseline specification, calculate the fitted values, use the fitted values to calculate the residual in the second stage regression, standardize
the residuals to have mean zero and variance one, and finally rerun the 2SLS regression with the sample definition limited to countries that
have a standardized residual between -1.96 and 1.96. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean
temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age. For outcomes in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. For IVs,
columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British
legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to
grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A15: 2SLS Regression Excluding G7 Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2019
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.0 -4.6 -2.5 -3.6 0.2 -25.5 -2.3 -2.9 -1.9 -1.1
(0.5) (4.6) (0.7) (1.6) (2.8) (98.4) (0.6) (0.8) (0.6) (0.5)
Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -3.1 -2.8 -2.1 -1.4 -3.7 2.9 -2.5 -2.9 -2.3 -2.0
(1.4) (1.2) (0.9) (1.4) (1.9) (16.3) (0.7) (1.0) (0.7) (0.9)
Dependent Variable is Covid-19-related Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) 88.2 9.3 203.4 334.6 -108.8 -2866.5 302.9 504.2 205.0 204.5
(91.5) (158.4) (108.7) (98.3) (178.0) (7920.8) (98.4) (113.3) (47.4) (114.1)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 75 75 87 87 91 91 129 129 135 135
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS regression estimates of democracy’s effect on the GDP growth rate in 2020, the mean GDP growth rate in 2001-
2019, and Covid-19 deaths per million in 2020 that excludes G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) from the sample definitions. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns
1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean
precipitation, population density, and median age. For outcomes in 2020, we also control for diabetes prevalence. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use
log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and
8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals
(bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions
and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A16: Democracy’s Effect on Economic Growth by Decade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: No Control for Baseline GDP
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1981-1990
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 1980) -0.3 0.1 -1.1 -62.0 0.1 0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -1.0 -0.1
(0.6) (1.4) (0.8) (420.2) (0.7) (1.0) (0.8) (1.0) (0.6) (1.0)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1991-2000
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 1990) -0.9 -7.1 -1.2 -5.2 -0.7 -4.5 0.3 0.6 -1.0 0.3
(0.7) (6.6) (0.6) (2.9) (0.7) (6.6) (1.2) (1.0) (0.6) (1.2)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2010
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.9 -4.2 -2.8 -3.5 -2.6 -2.8 -1.7 -1.9 -3.0 -2.5
(0.4) (1.0) (0.5) (0.9) (0.5) (1.7) (1.1) (0.7) (0.6) (0.6)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2011-2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2010) -1.4 -1.7 -1.8 -2.3 -1.0 -1.0 -1.4 -1.4 -1.9 -1.8
(0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.5) (0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Panel B: Control for Baseline GDP Per Capita
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1981-1990
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 1980) 2.0 1.6 90.4 8.6 1.9 1.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.5
(0.9) (0.9) (1941.6) (10.6) (0.7) (0.6) (1.3) (0.9) (1.0) (0.8)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1991-2000
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 1990) -0.4 -0.9 -2.5 -4.4 2.4 9.2 0.1 0.7 -0.1 0.3
(2.3) (6.5) (1.3) (2.6) (9.6) (34.2) (1.1) (0.8) (0.6) (0.9)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2010
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -1.8 -2.3 -2.2 -3.0 1.2 17.5 -2.2 -1.3 -2.6 -1.8
(1.1) (3.5) (0.7) (1.2) (4.7) (66.2) (0.8) (0.5) (0.8) (0.6)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2011-2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2010) -1.3 0.8 -3.2 -4.9 1.2 12.6 -2.1 -1.5 -2.6 -1.7
(1.1) (4.0) (1.0) (2.4) (3.0) (24.5) (0.7) (0.4) (0.6) (0.4)
Panel C: Control for Baseline Total GDP
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1981-1990
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 1980) -0.7 -0.2 -3.5 -12.6 0.2 0.6 -3.6 -3.2 -1.0 -0.9
(0.9) (1.5) (3.1) (14.6) (1.1) (1.1) (3.4) (3.5) (0.6) (1.6)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 1991-2000
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 1990) -1.1 -7.5 -1.7 -5.1 -0.8 -4.5 -0.5 0.7 -1.4 0.3
(0.9) (7.8) (0.7) (2.3) (1.3) (7.5) (1.2) (0.8) (0.6) (1.1)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2001-2010
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -2.7 -4.1 -2.6 -3.5 -1.9 -0.8 -1.7 -1.3 -3.2 -2.3
(0.5) (1.6) (0.6) (0.9) (1.4) (3.5) (1.3) (0.7) (0.6) (0.8)
Dependent Variable is Mean GDP Growth Rate in 2011-2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2010) -1.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.7 -1.1 -0.8 -1.8 -2.0 -2.1 -2.2
(0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (0.8) (0.4) (0.6) (0.3) (0.4)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls Other Than Baseline GDP 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 69 69 77 77 80 80 118 118 124 124
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS regression estimates of democracy’s effect on mean GDP growth rates in 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2010, and
2011-2020. Panel A does not control for baseline GDP. Panel B controls for baseline GDP per capita. Panel C controls for baseline total GDP. The
Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 also have the following controls:
absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, and median age. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler
mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking
English and the fraction speaking European, and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize,
millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). The sample size is slightly different from that in Table 2 because this table uses only observations
for which all GDP per capita and GDP growth rate data are available. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources
are in Appendix Table A2.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: OLS
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -4.8 -4.3 -72.8 -76.6 -59.5 -63.2 -1.2 -1.0 -1.4 -1.3
(1.6) (1.4) (19.3) (18.4) (26.7) (23.0) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
N 154 154 162 162 162 162 161 161 159 159
Panel B: Instrument for Democracy by Settler Mortality
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) 1.7 1.0 105.5 542.7 37.7 72.9 3.1 -2.9 -0.08 1.3
(8.8) (34.3) (146.4) (2927.5) (142.0) (644.4) (5.5) (3.9) (2.0) (18.3)
N 72 72 77 77 77 77 76 76 77 77
Panel C: Instrument for Democracy by Population Density in 1500s
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -8.3 -9.1 -105.5 -98.5 -68.2 -54.5 -3.3 -3.6 -2.4 -2.9
(2.6) (2.7) (54.6) (51.3) (39.5) (33.7) (1.8) (1.5) (0.7) (0.8)
N 84 84 89 89 89 89 87 87 87 87
Panel D: Instrument for Democracy by Legal Origin
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) 6.1 44.4 585.9 2847.0 173.8 1495.4 -20.0 -22.4 8.3 159.8
(26.7) (260.8) (1513.1) (21265.3) (572.2) (11203.5) (44.4) (45.2) (29.1) (4974.5)
N 88 88 93 93 93 93 91 91 91 91
Panel E: Instrument for Democracy by Language
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -8.0 -7.5 -115.6 -123.7 -80.1 -82.4 -3.2 -3.7 -1.6 -1.4
(1.6) (1.9) (27.9) (36.2) (33.2) (37.2) (1.1) (1.3) (0.5) (0.6)
N 128 128 135 135 135 135 134 134 133 133
Panel F: Instrument for Democracy by Crops and Minerals
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -9.8 -8.4 -113.7 -108.3 -93.5 -95.2 -2.4 -1.9 -2.0 -1.9
(1.5) (2.0) (33.8) (23.5) (37.7) (36.2) (0.7) (1.0) (0.8) (0.6)
N 133 133 141 141 141 141 139 139 138 138
Baseline Controls Other Than Baseline GDP 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: This table reports the OLS (Panel A) and 2SLS (Panels B-F) regression estimates of democracy’s effect on potential mechanisms in 2001-2019 with controls
for GDP per capita and total GDP in 2000. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The dependent variables are
the mean of each of the following variables in 2001-2019: investment share in GDP (%) (columns 1-2), the import value index (2000=100) (columns 3-4), the export
value index (2000=100) (columns 5-6), manufacturing, value added (annual % growth) (columns 7-8), and services, value added (annual % growth) (columns 9-10). For
IVs, Panel B uses log European settler mortality, Panel C uses log population density in the 1500s, Panel D uses British legal origin, Panel E uses the fraction speaking
English and the fraction speaking European, and Panel F uses the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice,
rubber, and wheat). All columns control for GDP per capita and total GDP in 2000. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 additionally control for absolute latitude, mean temperature,
mean precipitation, population density, and median age. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: OLS
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) 0.2 0.1 0.02 0.005 0.1 0.003 -0.5 -0.002
(0.1) (0.1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.07)
N 132 132 156 156 148 148 164 164
Panel B: Instrument for Democracy by Settler Mortality
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -0.008 0.04 0.06 0.004 0.5 0.07 -0.8 -0.2
(0.07) (0.1) (0.03) (0.2) (0.08) (0.2) (0.4) (0.2)
N 57 57 73 73 66 66 77 77
Panel C: Instrument for Democracy by Population Density in 1500s
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) 0.02 0.2 0.06 0.10 0.4 0.10 -0.7 -0.2
(0.05) (0.1) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
N 66 66 84 84 76 76 89 89
Panel D: Instrument for Democracy by Legal Origin
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 0.8 0.4 0.8 -0.7 0.3
(0.09) (0.2) (0.02) (1.4) (0.09) (1.0) (0.3) (0.3)
N 69 69 88 88 80 80 93 93
Panel E: Instrument for Democracy by Language
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) -0.08 -0.1 0.001 -0.02 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.1
(0.2) (0.1) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.6) (0.1)
N 109 109 131 131 124 124 136 136
Panel F: Instrument for Democracy by Crops and Minerals
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2000) 0.2 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.2 0.008 -0.8 -0.05
(0.1) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.3) (0.09)
N 112 112 135 135 127 127 142 142
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
Notes: This table reports the OLS (Panel A) and 2SLS (Panels B-F) regression estimates of democracy’s effect on potential
mechanisms in 2001-2019. The Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
The dependent variables are the mean of each of the following variables in 2001-2019: log tax share in GDP (columns 1-2),
log primary school enrollment (columns 3-4), log secondary school enrollment (columns 5-6), and log infant mortality
(columns 7-8). The reported coefficient for democracy is multiplied by 100. For IVs, Panel B uses log European settler
mortality, Panel C uses log population density in the 1500s, Panel D uses British legal origin, Panel E uses the fraction
speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and Panel F uses the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (ba-
nanas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat). Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls,
while columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipita-
tion, population density, and median age. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources
are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A19: Democracy’s Effect on Excess Deaths in 2020
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable is Excess Deaths Per Million in 2020
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -774 17631 -889 2242 -177 6708 1170 98 -134 4
(945) (76623) (842) (1909) (782) (11461) (1408) (385) (362) (334)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 19 19 19 19 20 20 53 53 52 52
Notes: This table shows the results of 2SLS regressions on excess deaths per million in 2020. Excess deaths per million in 2020 is the total
number of deaths in 2020 in excess of the number of deaths which we might normally have expected in 2020. The model to calculate the
baseline fits a linear trend to years to adjust from long-term increases or decreases in deaths and fixed effects for each week or month. The
Democracy Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while
columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density,
median age, and diabetes prevalence. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density
in the 1500s, columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European,
and columns 9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber,
and wheat). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A20: 2SLS Regressions on Potential Policy Mechanisms Behind Democracy’s Effect in 2020
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Severity Dependent Variable is Containment Health Index at 10th Covid-19 Case (unit: std. deviation)
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Panel B: Coverage Dependent Variable is Coverage of Containment Measures at 10th Covid-19 Case (unit: %)
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -11.7 -8.9 -10.4 -9.3 -9.6 -7.9 -9.5 -9.1 -8.3 -9.2
(2.0) (0.8) (1.5) (0.5) (1.7) (1.3) (2.4) (1.2) (1.4) (0.8)
Panel C: Speed Dependent Variable is Days Between 10th Covid-19 Case and Any Containment Measure (unit: days)
Democracy Index (V-Dem, 2019) -0.8 -2.6 -3.2 -4.2 -3.4 -4.5 -1.0 -1.3 -0.8 -5.3
(3.2) (1.1) (2.3) (1.3) (2.7) (1.7) (2.8) (1.9) (2.3) (1.5)
IVs settler mortality population density legal origin language crops & minerals
Baseline Controls 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
N 76 76 87 87 91 91 133 133 136 136
Notes: This table reports the 2SLS estimates of democracy’s effect on potential policy mechanisms behind democracy’s negative impact in
2020, using five different IV strategies. Panel A reports the 2SLS estimates of democracy’s effect on the containment health index at the 10th
confirmed case of Covid-19. It is normalized to have standard deviation one. Panel B reports the 2SLS estimates of democracy’s effect on
the coverage of containment measures at the 10th confirmed case of Covid-19. Panel C reports the 2SLS estimates of democracy’s effect on
the number of days between the 10th confirmed case of Covid-19 and the introduction of any containment measure. The Democracy Index
(V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 have no controls, while columns 2, 4, 6,
8, and 10 have the following baseline controls: absolute latitude, mean temperature, mean precipitation, population density, median age, and
diabetes prevalence. For IVs, columns 1 and 2 use log European settler mortality, columns 3 and 4 use log population density in the 1500s,
columns 5 and 6 use British legal origin, columns 7 and 8 use the fraction speaking English and the fraction speaking European, and columns
9 and 10 use the ability to grow crops and mine minerals (bananas, coffee, copper, maize, millet, silver, sugarcane, rice, rubber, and wheat).
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Variable definitions and data sources are in Appendix Table A2.
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Table A21: Causal Mediation Analysis of Potential Policy Mechanisms in 2020
(1) (2) (3)
Severity Coverage Speed
Panel A Dependent Variable is GDP Growth Rate in 2020
Total Effect of Democracy -5.1 -5.1 -5.1
(4.0) (4.0) (4.0)
Direct Effect of Democracy -0.4 -0.6 -0.1
(1.9) (1.6) (4.2)
Indirect Effect Through Mediator -4.7 -4.5 -5.0
(5.6) (5.1) (13.7)
Panel B Dependent Variable is Covid-19 Deaths Per Million in 2020
Total Effect of Democracy 363.3 363.3 363.3
(149.9) (149.9) (149.9)
Direct Effect of Democracy 109.2 119.5 91.5
(49.9) (42.7) (202.4)
Indirect Effect Through Mediator 254.0 243.7 271.7
(173.4) (157.1) (701.8)
N 76 76 76
Notes: This table reports the results of causal mediation analyses of democracy’s effect on each outcome in 2020 with three potential
mediators: severity, coverage, and speed of policy responses. All regressions use log European settler mortality as an IV. The Democracy
Index (V-Dem) is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. We proxy for severity by Oxford COVID-19 Government
Response Tracker’s Containment Health Index at the 10th confirmed Covid-19 case, for coverage by the number of domains the policy covers
at the 10th confirmed Covid-19 case, and for speed by the number of days between the 10th case of Covid-19 and the date when the government
introduces any containment measure. This analysis implements the causal mediation analysis framework for linear IV models introduced by
Dippel et al. (2020). It estimates three effects: (i) the total effect of a single treatment variable (democracy) on the outcome (GDP growth rates
in 2020 or Covid-19 deaths per million in 2020), where the treatment variable is instrumented by a single IV (log European settler mortality),
(ii) the direct effect of treatment on the outcome, net of the effect of the mediator, and (iii) the indirect effect (mediation effect) of a mediator
(severity, coverage or speed of initial response) through which the treatment variable affects the outcomes. Under linearity, the resulting
identification framework is estimated using three separate 2SLS estimations of the effect of treatment on the mediator, the effect of treatment
on the outcome, and the effect of the mediator on the outcome conditional on treatment. All regressions are unweighted. The estimates in this
table are slightly different from those in Table A12 because this table uses only observations for which data for all mediators are available.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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